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The purpose of this thesis is to provide the United States Army Recruiting 
Command (USAREC) with background material for developing the bonus table of the 
Bonus Incentive Recruiter Model (BIRM) and to provide estimates of the BIRM's 
effects on recruiting. Since this incentive structure has not been field tested, it is 
critical for USAREC to accurately understand the possible outcomes, advantages, and 
shortcomings if the BIRM were implemented. 
The first part of this thesis describes a method for developing the bonus table that 
ties the recruiter's forecast to his actual production. The recruiter's decision problem is 
analyzed through an influence diagram and decision tree. The recruiter's decision is 
also modeled using utility theory, which provides a basis for the simulation. The bonus 
table, together with the recruiter's utility and cost functions, are used to estimate the 
amount of time and cost it takes the recruiters (in aggregate) to meet the Army's 
recruiting mission. 
The data from the simulation was used to estimate the effects of the utility, cost 
and production functions. The simulation found that USAREC should meet the Army's 
manpower goals with the BIRM and the cost should be less than hiring additional 
recruiters. 
THESIS DISCLAIMER 
Additionally, the reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this 
research may not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has 
been made within the time available to ensure that the programs are free of 
computational and logic errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application 
of these programs without additional verification is at the risk of the user. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) must increase their 
efficiency as they enter the 21st century. The current quota-based incentive system 
may not be the most efficient/effective way to motivate recruiters to produce at their 
highest levels. 
The Bonus Incentive Recruiter Model (BIRM) is an incentive structure that allows 
the recruiters to provide input on how much their local area can produce. The 
recruiters provide this information to USAREC by forecasting how much they can 
produce for each month. The recruiter's incentive to forecast accurately and at the 
highest possible level is a bonus paid to them for their production. 
A bonus table developed by USAREC shows the recruiters what payment they 
would receive if they forecast and produce at different levels. The bonus table is a 
critical element of the BIRM, because if the bonus payments are too low, then the 
recruiters will not be motivated to produce, and if the bonus payments are too high, 
then USAREC will pay more than is necessary for the recruits. 
An algorithm has been developed to calculate the bonus table. It ties the 
recruiter's forecast and production into the bonus payment, so that if the production is 
greater or smaller than the forecast, then the recruiter does not earn the maximum 
amount that he could have. Several factors that should be considered when developing 
the bonus table are discussed, such as the starting level of the payments and the 
minimum number of recruits that must be achieved in order to enter the bonus table. 
The primary key to the BIRM is to understand what influences a recruiter's 
decision to forecast a certain production level. Two different methods were used to 
model this recruiter's decision problem.     The first method used decision theory 
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constructs.   This process revealed that if a recruiter used expected values to make his 
decision, then he should forecast what the market will allow him to produce. 
The utility based model dealt with the utility the recruiters derived from the bonus 
payment. USAREC controls the levels of the bonus payments, and an assumption was 
made that the bonus payment influences the recruiter's producuction. A well-known 
logarithmic utility function was used to model the recruiter's utility function for 
money, which modeled the recruiter's utility as risk averse. A cost function that 
modeled the cost to the recruiter for recruiting p recruits was generated. This cost was 
the sacrifice the recruiter felt he had to pay to achieve/? recruits. 
Two measures of effectiveness (MOE) were established for this analysis. The first 
MOE was the time to completion (TTC) of the recruiting objectives. Regardless of 
what incentive system the recruiting command used, the recruiting command had to 
meet its required number of recruits for enlistment. This MOE measures the expected 
time for the recruiters to finish the recruiting year. Under both the quota and BIRM 
systems, the recruiters would complete their recruiting mission within the recruiting 
year, but the majority of the recruits under the BIRM would be recruited early in the 
recruiting year. 
The second MOE measured the cost of the different incentive systems. An 
assumption was made that the only relevant cost under the quota system was the 
supplementary pay given to recruiters for being active Army recruiters. The 
supplementary pay ranges between $165 and $275 per recruiter per month. In the 
BIRM, the simulation totaled the bonus payments awarded to recruiters until they met 
their recruiting goal. 
When the costs of the quota based system were compared with simulation 
generated BIRM costs, the costs under the BIRM were significantly lower than the 
costs under the quota system. Even the worst case cost of the BIRM was better than 
the expected cost under the quota system. 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted on the factors that influence the BIRM. In the 
simulation, the recruiter's production was modeled as normally distributed with respect 
to the forecast and then beta distributed with respect to the forecast. The analysis 
revealed that the production distribution does not significantly affect the time to 
completion and cost of the BIRM. Three of the four parameters from the utility and 
cost functions were found to be significant to the TTC variable and cost variable. 
Future empirical work should attempt to determine the exact nature of these 
distributions, especially the recruiter's cost function, since both parameters of the cost 
function, along with some of its interactions, were significant. 
Overall, the BIRM should outperform the quota-based system. Under the quota- 
based system, each recruiter would have to produce 1.5 recruits per month, or six 
recruits in a four month period. Under the BIRM, the recruiters would have to 
produce 1.75 recruits per month, or seven recruits in a four month period. Although 
the recruiters would have to produce only one more recruit over the four months, they 
would receive a bonus for the production of three of the seven recruits. The cost of 
paying this recruiter the bonus was found to be less than hiring more recruiters. 
USAREC should initiate a pilot study to test the BIRM with actual recruiters at a 
battalion. A battalion is recommended for the smallest test group because a battalion 
can encompass diverse recruiting environments. In this manner, data could be 




The U. S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) is responsible for recruiting 
civilians to enlist into the Army. The Department of the Army (DA) specifies the number 
and quality of civilians that USAREC must enlist annually. In past years, DA required 
approximately 76,000 recruits to access (enter) into the Army. Of these recruits, at least 
95% had to be high school graduates, at least 14% had to be female, and no more than 4% 
could have prior military experience.l 
To accomplish this mission, USAREC has five brigades covering all fifty states and 
several overseas locations. Each brigade has approximately eight battalions, and each 
battalion has four to six recruiting companies. The recruiting companies have recruiting 
stations spread throughout the local area to do the actual recruiting. 
USAREC divides the DA mission into monthly and quarterly goals. The monthly 
mission is passed through the brigades, battalions, and companies, down to the recruiting 
stations. Prior to 1994, each recruiter would be assigned a mission or quota. USAREC 
changed this policy in 1994, and now assigns the mission to the recruiting station to 
reduce the pressure on the individual recruiter. Each recruiting station is responsible to 
meet the monthly and quarterly recruiting goal. 
The Army recruiter must perform duties much like a salesperson by selling the Army 
to American youths primarily between the ages of 17 and 21. These recruiters begin by 
making contacts with youths at high schools, recruiting stations, or through informal 
1
 These numbers were extracted from a thesis proposal written by CPT Bums. US Army, dated 26 March 
1993. 
introductions.  The recruiters must encourage enough individuals to enlist in the Army so 
that the recruiting station meets its monthly quota. 
New recruits do not go into the Army immediately. Normally, new recruits enter the 
Delayed Entry Program (DEP), a system that allows the Army time to conduct a security 
check of the individual and to have the new recruits report to basic training when training 
seats are available. Because the recruit is not officially in the Army until he or she begins 
basic training, there may be a delay of one to six months after signing the contract. It is 
the recruiter's responsibility to ensure the prospect stays eligible for military service. 
The recruiting process has not changed significantly since the draft was eliminated 
over twenty years ago. In 1973 there was concern about how the services would fare 
after the draft was eliminated. The military had to offer better "packages" to draw 
potential recruits away from civilian industry. Because of this, the quality and quantity of 
the new recruits was determined in part by the state of the economy and the incentives 
offered to recruits. Popular incentives offered to recruits in the past were education 
benefits, skill training, shorter enlistment periods and enlistment bonuses. 
Although recruiting incentives have focused primarily on benefits to draw new 
recruits, the recruiters also have incentives to meet their mission. All recruiters are paid a 
monthly allowance between $165 and $275 because of the difficult conditions in which 
they must work. Additionally, the current incentive program includes a series of badges 
that the recruiters can earn for outstanding performance in recruiting. The biggest 
incentive for recruiters is the recruiters ring. The recruiter who has earned this ring is 
recognized as one of the top recruiters in the Army. These incentives, though, do not 
necessarily encourage recruiters to exceed their mission or maximize the recruiting 
market. 
An alternative incentive structure to the current one was proposed by Professors 
Terasawa and Kang of the Naval Postgraduate School. The Bonus Incentive Recruiter 
Model (BIRM) was briefly discussed in an NPS thesis titled U.S. Army Recruiting: A 
Critical Analysis of Unit Costing and the Introduction of Recruiting Bonus Incentive 
Model by Lyons and Riester (1993). One of the conclusions of this work was the current 
system appears to have inefficiencies that could be denying USAREC from achieving its 
full potential. The market may allow USAREC to contract many more recruits than the 
assigned quota, but because the recruiters have no incentive to overproduce, this potential 
windfall of recruits is "backpocketed." The recruiters will backpocket recruits only if the 
probability of leakage is low. Leakage is defined as backpocketed recruits that decide not 
to enlist in later months. 
One may ask why the Army should consider a different incentive structure if the 
recruiters are meeting their manpower goals. Many people believe in the adage, "If it 
isn't broken, don't fix it!" The first reason for exploring this incentive structure is cost. 
The Army recruiting goals fluctuate from year to year. This past fiscal year (FY), the 
Army had to recruit about 68,000 people but for FY 95, USAREC is expecting a mission 
of over 90,000 people. This 22,000 increase in the mission can be accomplished in one of 
three ways: 1) Hire more recruiters, 2) Get more out of the current force structure, or 3) 
A combination of 1) and 2). 
Secondly, a different incentive structure could produce other positive benefits. 
Perhaps the recruiters will feel that USAREC is more appreciative of their work, and 
would therefore have a better, more positive outlook towards recruiting. A positive 
attitude, essential for any salesperson, is especially important for Army recruiters since 
they are the first real contact many civilians have with any of the services. A different 
incentive structure could even lead to more non-commissioned officers (NCO's) 
volunteering for recruiting duty rather than being forced into it. Volunteers are normally 
easier to motivate and usually possess the "self-starter" quality that is critical in a 
salesperson's job. 
B. CURRENT INCENTIVE SYSTEM 
The current incentive structure does not encourage the recruiters to produce more 
than their "fair share" of the recruiting station's quota mission. In the past, one of the 
primary reasons recruiters produce only their quota was to avoid bad evaluation reports. 
At all levels of USAREC, the recruiting stations are closely monitored to ensure they meet 
their monthly quota. If a recruiter met his monthly quota, then he was deemed successful. 
Since success was measured monthly, any extra recruits the recruiter had would be held 
for the following month. 
The same mentality that prevailed when the recruiters had individual quotas prevails 
for the recruiting stations since the recruiters have no incentive or motivation to achieve 
above and beyond their station mission. If a recruiting station has met its monthly quota, 
then any extra prospects would be held for a future month. Although the Recruiting 
Command headquarters discourages this practice, there is nothing that prevents it from 
happening. 
This practice is prevalent because the recruiting process is a continuous cycle. The 
station receives a new quota and the recruiters strive to meet it during that month. As 
soon as the station meets its mission, the recruiters shift their attention to future months. 
The station's, and hence the recruiter's performance, is based primarily on his ability to 
meet the mission, not necessarily to exceed it. This continuous monthly cycle creates an 
atmosphere for the recruiter to hold any extra prospects until the following month. This 
practice is known in the recruiting business as "backpocketing," because the recruit is held 
in the recruiters back pocket until he is needed for the next recruiting mission. 
The Bonus Incentive Recruiter Model (BIRM) should reduce the number of recruits 
that are backpocketed because it provides an incentive to the recruiter to process any 
recruits he "holds" into the service. Section III. C explains in detail the BIRM and how it 
motivates the recruiters to produce as many recruits as their region will allow. 
C. THE BONUS INCENTIVE RECRUITER MODEL (BffiM) 
1. Introduction 
In the BIRM incentive structure the recruiter, like the card player in the game of 
Spades1, must forecast his performance over a specified period of time (monthly or 
quarterly), and at the end of this period, the actual results are tabulated. The key to this 
incentive model is linking the recruiter's market forecast to his actual production. The 
recruiter goes to the bonus table and aligns his actual production with his forecast to 
determine his bonus for that period. Under this system, the recruiter would be rewarded 
based on how accurately he forecasts his production. The higher and more accurate the 
forecast, the higher the recruiter's reward will be. The best payments in the bonus table 
are along the diagonal where the forecast equals the production. If the time period were 
monthly, then the process would be: 
a. The recruiter forecasts the number of people he will contract for the month. 
b. The recruiter recruits for that month. 
c. The recruiter's actual performance is compared to the forecast. 
d. The bonus table is used to determine the bonus payment for his recruiting 
efforts. 
2. BIRM Model Highlights 
The bonus incentive model is an alternative to the current quota system.   The 
highlights of the BIRM incentive model are as follows (Lyons and Riester, 1993): 
2
 The BIRM incentive structure is very similar to the card game Spades. Spades is normally played by 
two teams of two players. Each player on each team is dealt thirteen cards, and then estimates the number 
of books (or tricks) they can make from their hand. Then as a team, the two members estimate the total 
number of books they will make. A book is won by having the highest card of the suit that led the current 
play. The game is called Spades because spades are considered the trump suit, or the suit that defeats any 
other suit. The strategy of the game is to bid your hand as close to the actual number of books you win. If 
you underbid, you do not achieve the maximum number of points for the round. If you overbid and fall 
short of your bid. then you lose points from your score. 
a. It provides an incentive for recruiters to surpass quotas and thereby maximize the 
true market potential. 
b. It rewards recruiters with monetary bonuses based on their work effort and their 
ability to forecast. 
c. In the long run, it rewards recruiters equitably despite regional market differences. 
d. It will provide, in the long run, valuable market information to the USAREC 
headquarters that will allow efficient future resource reallocation to the productive 
regions. 
e. It will help reduce the recruiter's tendency to delay or hold applicants for future 
months thereby improving market information to the USAREC Headquarters. 
f By changing the bonus table, the model is adjustable to reflect changing Army 
accession requirements, 
g. The model is capable of maintaining quality marks. 
D. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide USAREC with some background material on 
developing the bonus table and to provide preliminary estimates of the effects of the 
BIRM on recruiting. Since this incentive structure has not been field tested, it is critical to 
accurately understand the possible outcomes, advantages, and shortcomings if it were 
implemented. The use of computer simulation techniques will be used to help understand 
the BIRM and its impact. In the process of conducting this analysis, other complementary 
issues concerning the BIRM will be examined, such as how USAREC will meet its Army- 
wide accession requirements. 
n. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. RELATED STUDIES - BONUS TABLE ANALYSIS 
The first section of this thesis is an analysis of developing the bonus table for the 
BIRM. The bonus table is the compensation that USAREC gives to the recruiters for 
forecasting and producing a certain number of recruits. There are many books that deal 
with compensation management. Henderson (1982) discusses compensation management 
in great detail and provides insight into the difficult issues that should be addressed when 
establishing performance based rewards. He also gives a detailed analysis of how 
behavioral science concepts need to be considered to account for the human psyche issues. 
Although Henderson wrote his book in the context of industry, the discussion is applicable 
to the military since USAREC is in the "business" of selling the Army to American 
youths. 
B. RELATED STUDffiS - RECRUITER INCENTIVES 
USAREC has an umbrella agreement with the Naval Postgraduate School to conduct 
research on some of their most pressing problems. Much of the previous research dealt 
with increasing the efficiency of the recruiting effort. Additionally, because recruiting 
issues affect all of the services, there have been several theses that have dealt with the 
recruiting practices and problems in the Navy. 
The thesis written by Lyons and Riester builds the framework for the BERM model 
and addresses the question of whether or not changing the incentive structure would make 
an impact. Their thesis focused on the inefficiency caused by the quota system, and they 
showed that the recruiters could produce better results than the quota system. 
This thesis will differ from their work in that an analytical approach will be developed 
to assist USAREC in determining the effects of the BIRM. Additionally, this thesis will 
discuss the development of the bonus table, which is a critical component of the BIRM. 
Lewis (1987) examined the influence of environmental factors on recruiting 
categories I - IIIA3. Factors such as unemployment rates, geographic region and other 
environmental elements were found to significantly affect the number of contracts 
achieved by the recruiter. This study is relevant to the current thesis because it showed 
that there are factors outside of USAREC's control that affects the recruiter's productivity 
and should be considered in the model to help better simulate the recruiting process. 
In Navy Recruiter Productivity and the Freeman Plan, a study conducted by the 
RAND corporation for the Navy, Asch (1990) concludes that the Navy's incentive 
program could, in some circumstances, motivate the recruiters to not perform their best 
and may have also encouraged recruiters to enlist lower quality people, contrary to the 
Navy's recruiting goals. Asch's study provides valuable insights into some of the 
psychological issues of recruiting which are incorporated into our model through the 
derivation of the recruiter's utility function. 
- The Army considers categories I - IIIA to be high quality candidates for enlistment and the designation 
is based primarily on the results of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) and the recruit's high 
school graduation status. 
m. BONUS TABLE DEVELOPMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before attempting to generate a model for the bonus table, several preliminary issues 
must be addressed. The first building block for the model is identifying the appropriate 
number of new recruits that the recruiters much achieve in order to start earning the 
bonus. The second building block is the determination of how to change from one 
prediction/production level to another. Finally, the base payment vector must be 
established to calculate the rest of the table. These three elements will be used to develop 
the bonus table. 
B. PRELIMINARY ISSUES 
1. Minimum Recruits Needed to Enter Bonus Table 
This section discusses the minimum number of recruits the recruiter must access in 
order to start earning the bonuses. It is important that the incentives appear fair to all 
recruiters, regardless of the type of market they are working in. If the recruiters view the 
initial level as reasonable, then the recruiters will provide USAREC with important 
information about the local recruiting market. If the local market is good and the bonus 
table is satisfactory, then the recruiter's forecast will provide USAREC with valuable 
information on the current recruiting climate. If the market is not good, then the 
recruiter's forecast will be lower but it still provides USAREC with information on the 
local market. An example illustrates the critical nature of this information. 
a. An Example Illustrating Why a Minimum Threshold Must Be Set 
Suppose the starting recruiting level for the bonus is two new recruits per 
month.  For the recruiter who works in a dense population center (like New York City), 
producing even four recruits may not be too difficult. The four-recruit level could even be 
less than the production that was expected under the old quota based system. This 
recruiter would forecast four or more, since he was producing more before. This recruiter 
would find that using the bonus table would be easy. 
Contrast the previous recruiter with one based in a less dense population area 
(such as Nebraska). This recruiter could have been hard pressed under the old quota 
system to produce two recruits per month, and it would probably be more difficult for him 
to reach the threshold of the bonus table because of the environment. 
The starting level of the number of new recruits for the bonus table is critical. 
USAREC must set the level high enough to make a recruiter work and forecast accurately 
while at the same time set it low enough so that recruiters feel that it's fair and achievable. 
The example above seems unfair to one recruiter and advantageous to the other. The 
recruiter in New York City would be happy to have the table start at two recruits because 
then he could enter the bonus table with a minimum of extra work. On the other hand, the 
recruiter in Nebraska would probably have to work harder to exceed the minimum 
required level. 
In the short run, the recruiters may not be on level ground. However, the 
recruiters who use the bonus table provide the type of information that will help USAREC 
allocate the next recruiter, because then USAREC knows where the market is rich. Along 
with other relevant marketing information, USAREC can decide where to allocate more 
recruiters. 
b. A starting point for establishing the minimum required recruit level 
The national historical production level (NHPL) could be a basis for a 
starting point for establishing the minimum required recruit level. The NHPL is the 
average number of recruits that the recruiters have produced over the year. Production 
data from USAREC indicated that each recruiter averaged about 1.29 recruits per month 
in FY 94.   If the recruiting station was historically producing above the NHPL, then the 
10 
recruiters in that station would have a better chance of entering the bonus table. If, 
however, the station were located in an area where the local production level was less than 
the NHPL, then the recruiters would find it more difficult to enter the bonus table. 
C. BASE TABLE ALGORITHM 
The bonus table must reward more accurate and higher levels of the forecast. In 
order to do this, the bonus table has to tie the recruiter's forecast to his actual production. 
The following algorithm was developed for this thesis, and is one way that the recruiter's 
forecast can be tied to his production. The base table is used to change from one 
prediction/production level to another. 
First, the variables used in building the base table are defined: 
Let     p = the forecasted number of recruits by the recruiter 
k = the actual production of the recruiter 
BPk= the base value for forecast/? and production k 
Base Payment Vector (BPV) = the base payments in the bonus 
table when the forecast equals the production 
*M = 
(p-k)/p    ifp > k 
(k-p)lk    ifp<k (1) 
0 ifp = k 
Table 1 shows the values for Bpu for forecasted and production values between one 
and five. The base table is used to change the recruiters bonus payment when he does not 
forecast his production accurately. 
As the recruiter's production deviates from his forecast, only a percentage of the next 
step is subtracted or added to the BPV. The step is defined as the incremental jump of the 
payment in the BPV. For an example, if the payment for forecasting one and producing 
one is $50, and the payment for forecasting two and producing two is $75, then the step is 
the difference in the two payments, or $25. 
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Prediction (p) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Production 
00 
1 0.00 0.50 0.67 0.75 0.80 
2 0.50 0.00 0.33 0.50 0.60 
3 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.25 0.40 
4 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.20 
5 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00 
Table 1 Base Table (Values of BPk) 
D. BONUS TABLE DEVELOPMENT 
The BPV is the vector of payments that are used to calculate the bonus table. The 
base vector are the payments in cells (1,1), (2,2),...(p,k), where the first number indicates 
the prediction level and the second number represents the actual production of the 
recruiter. Determining these payments is discussed later in this section. Together with the 
base table, a complete bonus table can be formed. 
1. Preliminary Bonus Table Analysis 
In order to help understand how the values in the table should compare to one 
another, an analysis of a portion of the bonus table is conducted. Table 2 is a (3 x 3) 
bonus table with Ai, Bi, Ci, and Di substituted for actual bonus payment values. 
In order to meet the objective of rewarding more accurate and higher forecasts, 
the payments in the table must increase in the following order: Bi < Ai < Ci < DL Payment 
Bi is the payment when the recruiter predicts two but produces one, so the recruiter is 
penalized for falling short of the forecast. If the recruiter produced two when one was 
predicted (Ci), then the payment would be greater than if he had predicted one and 
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produced one (Ai).   However, the recruiter could have maximized the bonus if he had 
accurately forecasted two recruits (Di). 
Production(k) 
Prediction (p) 
1 2 3 
1 Ai Bi 
2 c, Di 
3 
Table 2 Bonus Table Analysis 
By shifting the payments in Table 2 one column to the right, some additional insight 
can be gained on the magnitudes of the bonus payments. Suppose the payments are as 
shown in Table 3 below. For this example, the payments should fall in the following 
order: B2 < A2 < D2 < C2. Payments B2 and C2 are straight-forward in their relative 
placement to the other payments. D2 should be greater than A2, even though both fell 
short of the forecast by one, because D2 had a higher forecast and production. 
Prediction (p) 
Production(k) 
1 2 3 
1 A2 B2 
2 c2 D2 
3 
Table 3 Bonus Table Analysis 
2. Bonus Table Calculations 
The bonus table amounts were calculated using the following formula: 
Let Xpk = base payment amount for prediction/? and production k.  This payment 
is located in the bonus table when the production (k) equals the forecast (p). 
Let Ypk = bonus payment. 
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, then the bonus table shown in Table 4 can be produced from 
the base table (Table 1). 
Prediction (p) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Production 
(k) 
1 50.00 37.50 20.87 2.16 0.004 
2 62.50 75.00 58.50 37.63 15.10 
3 70.88 83.25 100.00 81.25 58.75 
4 77.16 87.38 106.25 125.00 105.00 
5 82.18 89.85 108.75 130.00 150.00 
Table 4 Bonus Table 
E. BONUS TABLE ANALYSIS 
In order to adequately analyze the bonus table, we should first analyze the base table, 
since the bonus table is derived from the base table. The base table is a tool to adjust the 
4
 If the bonus table value was less than zero when Equation 2 was applied, then the bonus table value was 
set to zero. 
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recruiter's reward, either a positive amount for exceeding the forecast, or a negative 
amount for falling short of the forecast. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of Table 4, 
with a negative sign in front of the value if the recruiter's production was less than the 
prediction. In this format, it is easier to see that the recruiter incurs a penalty whether he 
overproduces or underproduces relative to the forecast. The recruiter's penalty for 
overproducing is the opportunity cost of foregone payments. Had he forecasted at the 
actual level produced, then he would have earned more. Thus, the recruiter receives only 
a portion of the highest possible payment for that level of production. 
Base Table Analysis 
Prediction (p) 
- Production = 1 





Production = 5 
Figure 1 Base Table Analysis 
Notice that the curves are steeper at lower production levels than at higher levels. 
The recruiter's marginal return gets smaller as the recruiter overproduces. The intention 
of developing the table this way is to provide the motivation to the recruiter to accurately 
forecast production. If the lines in the graph are above y = 0, then the recruiter has 
overproduced, and if the line is below y = 0 , then the recruiter has underproduced. 
The bonus table must provide an incentive for the recruiters to predict accurately 
and at the highest level possible. Figure 2 shows the marginal increase that the recruiter 
receives for higher forecasts with a given level of production.   This figure is the bonus 
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table, with each connected line being the recruiter's production level. The points on the 
highest line are the payments for producing five recruits when the forecast was 1, 2, 3, 4 
or 5. The highest payments for the recruiter at any given production level is when his 
forecast equals his production. Notice, though, that the recruiter is not penalized the same 
amount for each shortfall. For instance, the percentage loss from predicting three and 
producing two is less than if the recruiter predicted two and produced one. (42% loss 
versus 50% loss). Therefore, the recruiter incurs a higher penalty for a shortfall at lower 
forecasts rather than at higher forecasts. 
Bonus Table Analysis 
150 
2 3 4 
Prediction (p) 
-O— Production k = 1 
-a— Production = 2 
-A— Production k=3 
-•— Production k=4 
-*— Production k =5 
Figure 2 Bonus Table Analysis 
F. AT WHAT DOLLAR AMOUNT SHOULD PAYMENTS START? 
Because the base table algorithm was used to develop the bonus table, the analysis on 
the bonus table would be the same whether the base vector started at $75 or if it started 
with $20. The natural question that arises is "Where should the payment start?" 
1. Utility Theory Considerations 
The recruiter's utility for money is one factor that must be considered for the base 
payment vector (BPV). If the BPV is set too high or too low, then the expected results 
could be far different from the actual results. If the BPV was too high, then the incentive 
costs could exceed the predicted costs if more recruiters use the BIRM than expected.  If 
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the BPV is too low, then the expected number of new recruits could fall short because the 
recruiters do not believe the bonus payment is worth their time and effort.   Section IV. B 
discusses utility theory in more detail as well as how recruiters view the bonus payments. 
2. Incentive Program Budget 
Another important factor when developing the BPV is the budget for the 
incentive program. The incentive program must produce the right number of recruits 
within the budget for it to be considered a success. For this analysis, the costs and 
expected gains (in recruits) will be estimated through the simulation. 
USAREC has two options with regards to the cost. They can maximize the 
number of recruits within cost x, or they can minimize the cost for y recruits. Since the 
Army must meet its manpower requirements, USAREC would presumably try to minimize 
the cost for y recruits. This objective will be transformed into a measure of effectiveness 
for the simulation. 
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IV. MODELING THE RECRUITER'S DECISION 
A. MODELING USING DECISION THEORY CONSTRUCTS 
1. General 
The recruiter must decide which prediction level he should make based on the 
bonus table and the local recruiting environment. This decision process will be modeled 
first under decision theory constructs. The recruiter's decision will affect the effort he will 
put forward, and ultimately affect the payoff received. An influence diagram for the 
recruiter's decision problem is shown in Figure 3. The influence diagram graphically 
depicts the factors that affect the recruiter's decision, and the events are placed in 
chronological order from left to right. As shown in the figure, the bonus table affects the 
recruiters forecast, the number recruited, and the resulting bonus payment. 
The influence diagram shows that once the bonus table is developed, the recruiter 
must make a decision on what amount to forecast. This decision affects the number that 
the recruiter recruits and the payoff received. Since the recruiter forecasts his production, 
the recruiter should be expected to strive toward achieving this amount. His decision also 
affects the payoff, since the bonus payment the recruiter receives is a function of the 
forecast (p) and production (k). 
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Bonus Table 
(Y)                         Recruiter's 
V_v<^~ ——-—production (k) Result 
^V > (Payoff) 




Figure 3 Influence Diagram of Recruiter's Decision 
2. Analysis of the Recruiter's Decision 
An easy way to see the decisions that the recruiter has to make is through a 
decision tree.  The decision tree for the recruiter's situation is shown in Figure 4 below. 
The two branches coming from the 'T' node are the payments USAREC can set for the 
bonus table. The sweeping arcs indicate that USAREC has an infinite number of payment 
vectors it can make. 
The Y node connects to the D node, which is where the recruiter makes his 
forecasting decision. The branches from the D node are the choices the recruiter can 
make for forecasts. Like the bonus table, there are an infinite number of choices the 
recruiter can forecast, so the branches go from zero to n. 
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forecast = 0 
-<£>• 
forecast = 1 
production = 0 
ai,o production = 1 
• production = n 




x production =1   <£> 
production = 0 
a2,0 
-production = n 
»2,n 
forecast = n 
production = 0 
an,0 
^production = 1 
an,l 
■O V. 
-production = n O^ 
Figure 4 Recruiter's Decision Tree 
If an assumption is made that each recruiter must produce at least one recruit per 
month, then the first branch is not needed. For the other branches, the X node represents 
the random variable of the actual number of recruits produced. The diagram shows there 
is no upper bound on the number of recruits the recruiter could produce. To simplify our 
problem, the number of branches has been limited by assuming that the vast majority of 
the recruiters will produce recruits in the range of (-2,-1, 0,1,2) of their forecast. 
The probabilities on the branches, aPk, are the conditional probabilities that the 
recruiter produces k recruits, given the recruiter has forecasted p. For an example, 0:22, 
represents the probability that the recruiter produces two given that he has forecasted two. 
If the recruiters made their decision based on expected values, then the recruiter 
decision problem can be stated as: 
Max   5>i*(r/*) 
rPk is the bonus payment set by USAREC, and aPk must be estimated. 
(3) 
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This problem can be solved only when the market information is known.   For 
instance, if a market could only produce two recruits, then the recruiter would not be 
expected to forecast five recruits. For this analysis, the recruiter is assumed to be aware 
of the number of recruits that his market could support. 
4. Solution using Decision Theory 
The solution to this decision problem is determining what forecast the recruiter 
should make, given he knows the market conditions. A market that will support one 
recruit per month is analyzed first. 
Suppose the data shown in Table 5 was known. The table shows the recruiter's 
forecast, production and bonus payments. Also estimated is a probability of production 
level k, given the market. 
Forecast Production Bonus 
Payment 




1 1 50.00 .80 52.50 
2 62.50 .20 
2 1 37.50 .80 45.00 
2 75.00 .20 
Table 5 Hypothetical Data for One-Recruit Market 
Eighty percent of the time the recruiter will produce one recruit when the market 
supports one recruit, and the recruiter produces two recruits twenty percent of the time. 
The expected payoffs for forecasting one and two recruits are $52.50 and $45.00, 
respectively. If the recruiter based his decision on expected payoffs, then he would 
forecast one to maximize his return. 
The indifference probability is the probability when the recruiter is indifferent to 
choosing one forecast or the other, because they produce the same result. It can be 
obtained by setting the expected value equations equal to each other, with p and 1-p 
substituted as the probability of producing one and two recruits, respectively. Equation 4 
finds the indifference probability for the one-recruit market. 
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50 p + 62.5 ( J-p) = 37.50p+ 75 ( 1-p) (4) 
Solving for p yields an indifference probability of 0.50. If p > 0.50, then the 
recruiter should forecast one recruit. If the recruiter believes he can achieve two recruits 
more than fifty percent of the time, then he should forecast two recruits. If he believes 
either one or two recruits could equally be the outcome, then it does not matter which 
forecast he makes. 
Table 6 is a summary of the two-recruit market. The assumption for this table is 
that twenty percent of the time the recruiter produces one recruit and eighty percent of the 
time he produces two recruits, then the recruiter's expected payoff would be $60.00 if he 
forecasted one recruit, and $67.50 if he forecasted two recruits. If the recruiter wants to 
maximize his expected return, then he should forecast two recruits. 
The indifference probability for this scenario is also 0.50. If the recruiter believes 
that the market will produce two recruits more than fifty percent of the time, then he 
should forecast two recruits. 
Forecast Production Bonus 
Payment 




1 1 50.00 .20 60.00 
2 62.50 .80 
2 1 37.50 .20 67.50 
2 75.00 .80 
Table 6 Hypothetical Data for Two-Recruit Market 
The previous two examples made a simplifying assumption that the recruiter 
would produce only one or two recruits.    This analysis is expanded to include three 
production levels. 
Suppose the data shown in Table 7 was known.   In this three- recruit market, 
twenty percent of the time the recruiter produces two recruits, sixty percent of the time he 
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produces three recruits, and 20 percent of the time he produces four recruits. By using 
the expected values for the three forecasts, the recruiter should forecast three recruits to 
maximize his expected payoff. 
An indifference probability for this problem cannot be found since there are three 
alternatives. However, if an assumption is made that producing two or four recruits are 
equally likely, then the best payoff is always when the recruiter forecasts three. Since the 
BIRM exposes the true-market potential, the recruiter should forecast what his market 
will allow. 
Forecast Production Bonus 
Payment 




2 2 75.00 .20 82.47 
3 83.33 .60 
4 87.38 .20 
3 2 58.50 .20 92.95 
3 100.00 .60 
4 106.25 .20 
4 2 37.63 .20 81.28 
3 81.25 .60 
4 125.00 .20 
Table 7 Hypothetical Data for Three-Recruit Market 
B. RECRUITER'S DECISION USING UTILITY THEORY 
1. General 
Utility theory and decision making can be traced back to Nicolas Bernoulli. 
Bernoulli's St. Petersburg paradox was a game that dealt with the utility value of money. 
The player would pay an amount up front to play the game. The prize to the player would 
be determined by flipping a coin. The payment is based on the number of times "heads" 
came up before the first "tail." If the number of times that tail occurs is x, then the payoff 
would be 2X. Bernoulli's research showed that people were not likely to pay a lot to play 
the game, even though it was shown to have an infinite return. 
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In an attempt to find a solution to the St. Petersburg paradox, Nicolas Bernoulli 
posed the paradox to his younger cousin, Daniel Bernoulli. Daniel Bernoulli reasoned that 
the value, or utility, of money declined with the amount won (or already possessed). This 
observation set the stage for the later theories of choice behavior. (Pious, 1993). 
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern proposed expected utility theory in 
1947 as a normative theory of behavior. They intended expected utility theory to describe 
how people would behave if they followed certain requirements of decision making, not 
how people actually behave. Expected utility theory can be used as a base to compare 
behavior of real decision makers, and its simplicity has made it a popular model for 
decision making. 
The axioms of rational decision making are listed below. Most decision making 
texts contain detailed descriptions of the axioms. 





(6) Invariance (Pious, 1993) 
2. Applying Utility Theory to the Recruiter's Decision 
The marginal return of extra money to the recruiter is expected to decrease as the 
recruiter receives more money. Graphically, the utility function would then take the form 
shown in Figure 5. 
The payoff, d, is directly related to the number of recruits (k) that the recruiter 
produces. The recruiter's utility can be expressed as U(f(k)), where f(k) is the bonus table 
payoff for k recruits. 
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Figure 5 Recruiter's Utility Function 
The recruiter also incurs a cost for producing recruits. Although the cost function 
could be included in the recruiter's utility function, it is shown explicitly to add emphasis 
to its significance. Figure 6 shows the graph of the cost function. Intuitively, the cost 
curve is expected to have this shape since the effort the recruiter puts forward should 
increase as more recruits are produced. The x-axis in the figure has the units of recruits 
per unit time, but for simplicity, it will be referred to as the recruiter's production k. 
Figure 6 Recruiter's Cost Function 
The cost function c(k) is a subjective cost that the recruiter feels he has to pay to get k 
recruits.   This cost is measured by the value the recruiter places on his time and energy, 
and has the same units as the utility function. 
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3. Non-Linear Program and Solution to the Recruiters Decision 
For a single recruiter, the recruiter's decisionmaking problem can be stated as the 
following non-linear program: 
(5) MAX U(f(k)) - c(k) Subject to: k > 0 
If A: can be modeled as continuous, then the approximate optimal solution to this 
problem can be found by differentiating the objective function with respect to k.  If the 
functions are assumed to be well behaved, then: 
U'(f(k))f'(k)=  c'(k) (6) 
Graphically, the solution would be the maximum point on the curve, p versus 
U(f(k))-c(k) is plotted, the graph would look like Figure 7. The solution, p*, is the value 
that the recruiter should predict. 
U(f(k))-c(k) 
P* 





A computer simulation was developed using Turbo Pascal® that generates utility and 
cost curves for recruiters, forecast and production levels for the recruiters, and a bonus 
table. The results are then aggregated to form a representative recruiting station. A copy 
of the Turbo Pascal" code for this simulation is included in Appendix B. A copy of the 
output results is included in Appendix C. 
B. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) 
Before the simulation is constructed, the criteria for comparing the BIRM model with 
the old quota-based system must be established. The two MOEs used in this paper are the 
time to completion (TTC) for the recruiting year, and the estimated cost under the two 
incentive structures. The first MOE is the time in months that it takes USAREC to 
complete its recruiting mission. Assume under each incentive structure is the recruiting 
command has 4,200 recruiters available. The TTC under the quota system can be 
estimated by analyzing the historical data on production. The TTC value for the BIRM 
will be estimated through the simulation. The smaller the TTC, the better it is for 
USAREC since the goal is met earlier in the recruiting year. 
The second MOE is the estimated cost for recruiting an additional 22,000 recruits. 
This MOE is used because USAREC stated that they were increasing the number of 
recruiters to almost 5,000. This MOE will be used to determine what difference there is 
between adding the additional recruiters or using the BIRM incentive structure. The 
number of additional recruiters can be estimated by using the historical production rate. 
The cost of these additional recruiters can be estimated by multiplying the special duty 
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payment that the Army pays to the recruiters for being assigned to recruiting duty, by the 
number of additional recruiters. Although there are probably other costs that the Army 
incurs by assigning someone to recruiting duty (such as training costs), the special duty 
pay is assumed to be the only relevant cost for this analysis. 
The simulation estimates the total cost of recruiting these additional recruits under the 
BIRM system. The recruiter's forecast and prediction are used to enter the bonus table, 
and then the payments are combined to determine the total cost under the BIRM. This 
cost is compared to the total cost under the quota system to determine the better 
performer. A lower cost would be better under this MOE. 
C. SIMULATION CONSTRUCTION 
Once the MOEs are understood, the computer simulation is tailored so that it 
provides the information needed to test the BIRM versus the quota system. The computer 
simulation can be separated into three main components - program initialization, recruiter 
force aggregation, and an algorithm that outputs the data for the measures of 
effectiveness. 
1. Initialization 
The program initialization can be divided into two parts. The system drop- 
through initializes the simulation parameters. The program is run many times, but most of 
the initialization parameters do not change. Mean values for the utility and cost functions 
are established, but the program chooses the actual values by drawing them from a 
distribution. A recruiting level that must be achieved is also specified, and the time to 
complete this mission is used as one of the measures of effectiveness. 
The second part is the development of the key sub-systems of the BIRM model. 
The first procedure develops the bonus table as discussed in Section III. D. The program 
uses the base payment vector specified by USAREC and then calculates the rest of the 
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table. After the bonus table, the program develops the utility and cost functions for each 
recruiter. 
2. Utility and Cost Functions 
Among many utility functions described in decision making texts, the following 




1 + (*-!)( -e ) 
log B 
B>\ (7) 
B and 0 are the two parameters that uniquely define each utility function. B is a 
shape parameter that increases or decreases the magnitude of the utility. The graph of 
Equation 6 has the shape shown in Figure 5. This function models the utility the recruiter 
derives from a certain amount of money (x). The x values used in the simulation are the 
base payment vector from the bonus table development. Table 8 shows numerical values 
of u given the BPV, and how the value of the utility changes with values of B. 
X 5=3,0=3 5=8,0=3 
50 3.22 2.29 
75 3.58 2.49 
100 3.84 2.62 
125 4.04 2.73 
150 4.20 2.82 
Table 8 Utility Values (B variable) 
When B is increased, the range of the utility values decrease from 0.98 (4.20 - 
3.22) to 0.53 (2.82-2.29), or, almost half. An analogy of what B does is it acts like a trash 
compactor. As B increases, the magnitude and range of the utility decrease. 
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The utility procedure in the simulation program creates the recruiter's utility 
function by drawing the parameters B and 6 from normal distributions. The mean and the 
standard deviation for the distributions are specified in the system drop-through. After the 
program draws values for B and Ö, it creates unique utility and cost functions for all 4,200 
recruiters. Initially for this simulation, the means of B and 6 are set to three. The two B 
values in Table 8 illustrate how B changes the recruiter's utility function. Notice that by 
increasing B to eight, the utility values start and end at lower values than if B were three. 
The second parameter in the utility function, 6, decreases the utility function just 
as B does. As # increases, the utility function values decrease. 
X 0=3, B = 3 9=8, B = 3 
50 3.22 2.37 
75 3.58 2.72 
100 3.84 2.97 
125 4.04 3.16 
150 4.20 3.32 
Table 9 Utility Values (6 variable) 
Although the magnitude of the function is lower, the range of the utility function 
remains almost constant (0.98 versus 0.95). The d's impact is expected to be more limited 





B 3 1 
e 3 1 
Table 10 Parameter Values for Utility Function 
The only restrictions on B and <9 are that they must be positive, real numbers, and 
B must be greater than one.   The utility function is the first component that is used to 
estimate the recruiter's forecast.  The cost function also is needed to determine what the 
recruiter will predict. 
The cost function used in the simulation has the form: 
c(p) = apß (8) 
The cost function is defined in terms of the expected cost of producing/? recruits. 
Like the utility function, the cost function has two parameters, a and ß. The a parameter 
determines the initial magnitude of the cost and can be thought of as the cost multiplier. 
The ß parameter defines the rate of increase of the cost function. As stated 
earlier, the cost function is expected to take the shape shown in Figure 6. Because of this, 
the ß parameter is expected to be greater than one (linear cost function). The values in 
Table 11 are used as starting points for the simulation. Later, a test is conducted to see 




a 0.10 0.05 
P 1.60 0.25 
Table 11 Parameter Values Cost Function 
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3. Recruiter's Forecast 
The program uses the utility function, the cost function, and the bonus table to 
determine the recruiters forecast. The bonus table is used to calculate the recruiter's utility 
for different payments and the program calculates the perceived cost that the recruiter 
believes he pays for producing his prediction. The recruiter's prediction is determined by 
the maximum point where the utility exceeds the cost. If the recruiter's utility and cost 
functions lead the recruiter to predict zero recruits, then the program will assign a forecast 
of one. This was done because the real world data from FY 94 showed that the recruiters 
averaged about 1.29 recruits per month, or about four per quarter. The recruiters should 
predict at least to this level under the quota system. If, however, the utility and cost 
functions produced higher levels above one, then the program would use that as the 
prediction level. 
4. Recruiter's Production 
After finding the recruiter's prediction, the simulation then estimates the 
recruiter's production, k. The program draws the recruiter's production from a normal 
distribution with the mean equal to the recruiter's prediction. The normal distribution was 
based on the quota/production data from USAREC. Appendix D shows in detail the 
analysis that led to the adoption of the normal distribution for the production function. 
This assumption is checked by changing the distribution to a Beta distribution. 
The recruiter's production is expected to change with the prediction level. For 
instance, overproducing should occur more often if the recruiter has forecasted one recruit 
versus four or five recruits. Conversely, underproducing is more likely to occur when the 
forecast is at higher levels rather than at lower levels. Finally, the majority of the 
recruiters are assumed to produce at their forecast exactly. 
Let the variable Y denote the production and X the forecast. Since the 
probability distribution Y|X does not have any historical data in which to estimate it the 
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beta distribution is used to model it. In the absence of data, the beta distribution is often 
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Figure 8 Beta Distribution 
As can be seen in Figure 8, the recruiter's production, given that his forecast is 
known, can be modeled using a beta distribution. For instance, the distribution of Y|X=1 
is expected to look more like the Beta (1.5, 3) since the probability of exceeding one 
recruit to be higher and falling short to be lower. To model a prediction of X=4, the 
distribution would look more like a Beta (3, 1.5), since more recruiters are expected to fall 
short of the prediction rather than exceeding it. 
Both the normal and the beta distributions are used to model the recruiter's 
production and an analysis is conducted to determine if production impacts on our MOE. 
The analysis indicated that the production distribution does impact on both the time to 
complete the recruiting mission and the cost. Section V. A discusses this result in more 
detail. 
5. Aggregation of Recruiter Forecasts and Production 
The final part of the simulation aggregates the individual recruiter forecasts and 
production into a total recruiter force totaling the predictions and production for the 4,200 
recruiters into monthly statistics. These monthly statistics are used to estimate the MOEs 
discussed previously.   The program adds the monthly totals until the time to completion 
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(TTC) of the recruiting year is determined. Since the TTC usually varies between three 
and twelve months, the program repeats itself until a point estimate of the TTC is found 
with 90% confidence. The program does this by calculating the sample variance for the 
TTCs generated and then checks to see if the variance is within the prescribed bounds. If 
the TTC variance does not meet the stopping conditions, then the program repeats itself. 
The program generates new data for the utility and cost functions, determines new 
prediction and production for each recruiter for each month, and then aggregates the data 
to test the TTC. The program continues this cycle until the point estimate is within the 
tolerance. 
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VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The results for the computer simulation are in Appendix C. A summary of the 
simulation results of the BIRM are in Table 11. The variables TTCN and CostN are the 
time to completion of the recruiting mission and the estimated cost of the BIRM with the 
recruiter's production modeled as normally distributed. The variables TTCB and CostB 
are the time to completion of the recruiting mission and the estimated cost of the BIRM 
with the recruiter's production modeled as a beta distribution. Because the exact values 
for the parameters in the recruiter's cost and utility functions were not known exactly, 
each of the four parameters was set to two different values. The simulation was run for all 
combinations of the parameters, resulting in 24 = 16 runs of the simulation. The results of 
the 16 runs were averaged to get the values in Table 11. Later in this chapter, a 
comparison is made for the TTC and cost results to find if there was a significant 
difference between the normally distributed production and the beta distributed 
production. Finally, the data was analyzed to determine which parameters were the most 
significant in the model. 
A. NORMALLY DISTRIBUTED PRODUCTION 
1. TTCN Analysis 
In order to calculate the TTC under the BIRM, the number of recruits that the 
recruiters had to attain for the year had to be established. As stated in Chapter III, an 
assumption was made that the recruiters had to produce at least one recruit per month 
under the BIRM system. If the recruiter produced more than one per month, then he 
would be eligible for the bonus from the bonus table. Each of the 4,200 recruiters would 
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produce 12 recruits per year, plus any recruits under the BIRM system. For a 90,000 
recruit goal, the recruiters would be required to produce 50,400 recruits, and the 
remaining 39,600 would have to be produced under the BIRM. The simulation stopped 
when the recruiters produced 39,600 recruits. 
As Table 12 shows, it took an average of 4.45 months to achieve the 39,600 level 
if the recruiter's production was modeled as normally distributed. The best way to 
illustrate what 4.45 months means is to show it through a numerical example. If the 
recruiters concentrated on the requirement of achieving one recruit per month first and 
then recruited the other 39,600 recruits, then the time to achieve the 90,000 recruit goal 
was expected to be 16.45 months. 
This analysis should not imply that it would take the recruiters sixteen months to 
complete their mission under the BERM. The recruiters will be producing additional 
recruits for the bonus payment as they meet their minimum requirement for the month. 
The 4.45 months is only an estimate to achieve the 39,600 recruits if the recruiters focused 
solely on their minimum requirement first. 
TTCN CostN TTCB CostB 
4.45 1.20 4.24 1.18 
Table 12 Simulation Results 
The time it takes 4,200 recruiters to produce 90,000 recruits under the quota 
system can be compared to this time under the BIRM. If the recruiters produced at the 
current historical average of about 1.29 recruits per month, then it would take the 4,200 
recruiters about 16.60 months to achieve the 90,000 recruit goal. The Recruiting 
Command is hiring 750 more recruiters to reduce this 4.6 month deficit to zero. 
However, even with the extra recruiters, the efficiency level of the recruiters must increase 
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because 4,950 recruiters would have to average at least 1.51 recruits per month to reach 
90,000 recruits in 12 months.5  The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the two 
programs would achieve the recruiting goal in about the same amount of time. 
2. CostN Costs Analysis 
The simulation compiled the cost for the BIRM and calculated the cost of the 
additional recruiters under the quota system. All recruiters receive an allowance for being 
on recruiting duty. This supplementary pay was assumed to be the only relevant cost to 
USAREC for hiring more recruiters. The current range of the supplementary pay is 
between $165 and $275. If the median cost for the supplementary pay amount was used, 
then the total cost for the 750 additional recruiters would be almost 1.98 million dollars. 
The best case cost is when the recruiters receive $165 per month, for a total cost of 1.5 
million dollars. 
The simulation estimated the cost of the BIRM by generating prediction and 
production levels for the recruiters, and these in turn determined the bonus amount. The 
recruiter's bonuses were aggregated until the simulation showed that the recruiters 
produced 39,600 recruits. The total cost is also shown in Table 11. The average cost was 
1.28 million dollars for the normally distributed production function. 
The absolute "worst" case cost of the BIRM can be estimated by assuming that 
all recruiters predict and produce two recruits per month.    At this prediction and 
production level, the marginal return for a recruit is highest, equal to $50.  The estimated 
cost would be: 
$50 4200 recruiters x 12 months x  = 2.52 million dollars    (9) 
recruiter-month 
D
 The most recent production data from USAREC shows that the recruiters have increased their 
production. Appendix E shows what the recruiters have produced for the first ten months of FY 95. 
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The calculated worst case cost under the quota system is: 
$275 50 recruiters^ 12 months x   = 2.48 million dollars       (10) 
recruiter-month 
This analysis shows that the two worst case costs are almost the same, but the 
expected cost under the BERM was significantly less than the median or best case cost 
under the quota system. 
B. BETA DISTRIBUTED PRODUCTION 
1. TTCB 
The same approach that was taken to analyze TTCN and CostN was taken to 
analyze TTCB and CostB. From Table 12, the average TTCB was 4.24 months, just a 
little less than the normally distributed production. Similar analysis that applied to the 
normally distributed production function will follow for the beta distributed production 
function. The total time to complete the 90,000 recruit mission would take 16.24 months 
if the recruiters concentrated on producing one recruit per month for the first 12 months 
and then the recruits under the BIRM. The time expectancy under the quota system 
would again be 16.60 months. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is the two 
programs should achieve the goal in about the same amount of time. 
2. CostB Cost Analysis 
The analysis of the cost (CostB) using the beta distribution production function is 
identical to the analysis of the cost under the normally distributed production. The cost 
under the beta distributed production function averaged 1.18 million dollars. This cost is 
less than the cost for the normally distributed production functions and the estimated costs 
under the quota system. If our intuition is correct on the production distribution, then the 
best cost is achieved if the beta distribution models the production distribution. 
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C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL 
The data collection was designed so that sensitivity analysis of the relevant factors of 
the utility and cost functions could be conducted. The simulation could be characterized 
as a 24 factorial design, and MTNITAB® Statistical software was used to obtain the results 
in Appendix D. 
1. Factors and Levels 
The factors tested in this experiment were a and ß from the cost function, and B 
and 6 for the utility function. Third order and higher interactions between the factors 
were assumed not to be significant, so the experiment determined the main effects and 
second order interaction effects of the four factors. 
The levels for each of the factors are shown in Table 13. The levels were chosen 
so that they could provide as much information about their effects as possible. Realistic 
levels for each variable were also chosen. For ß, the two levels were chosen so that one 
cost function was nearly linear (ß= 1.1) and the other cost function increased 
exponentially (ß = 2.0). The other factors were chosen similarly. 
2. TTC Design of Experiment and Results 
The effects of the cost and utility parameters were estimated with the data in 
Appendix C. Complete tables showing the main effects and interaction effects are shown 
in Appendix D for TTCN, TTCB, CostN, and CostB. Table 13 summarizes the results of 
the effects for the four variables, a, ß, B, and the interaction between a and B are the 
common significant effects of the four outputs. (Significance level = .10) 
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Factor Low High 
a .10 .20 
P 1.1 2.0 
B 3 8 
e 3 8 
Table 13 Factors and Levels 
The most dominating factor for TTCN and TTCB was ß. It had a 60% greater 
effect than a. This implies that the cost function with its two parameters is the critical 
driver for the time it takes the recruiters to achieve their mission. If the recruiters expect 
to pay a high cost for recruiting p recruits, then the time will go up significantly. 
Surprisingly, the interaction between a and ß is not a significant effect, but separately, 
they exert the most control over TTC. As far as the utility function, B and its interaction 
with a are the most significant parameters. B, however, still has only half the effect of ß 
on the TTC. From this analysis, the proper identification of the cost function of the 
recruiter is one of the most important elements of the simulation. 
3. Cost Design of Experiment and Results 
For the cost analysis, a , ß and B have almost similar effects on the cost, 
regardless of how the recruiter's production is modeled. However, in CostN, the most 
significant effects are the interaction effects of a and ß , and the interaction effects of ß 
and B. For CostB, the four significant effects have almost the same magnitude, but the 
interaction effects of a and B are negative. The conclusion drawn again is the recruiters 
cost function plays a large role in determining the cost of the BIRM, so care should be 
taken to correctly model it. 
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TTCN TTCB CostN CostB 
Alpha (a) X X X X 
Beta (ß) X X X X 
B X X X X 
Alpha * B X X X X 
Beta * B X X 
Alpha * Beta X 
Table 14 Significant Effects of Each Variable 
D. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
1. TTC 
The data was tested to find out if the production probability distributions (normal 
versus beta) produced significantly different results. The raw data showed that the TTCN 
was 0.21 higher than TTCB. The following hypothesis was tested: 
•"o •   MTTCN    ~ MTTCB 
-"I •  MTTCN   > MTTCB 
01) 
Equation 11 was used to determine the test statistic. The test parameter was 
z.o5= 1.6445. For the TTCN and TTCB data, Z = .74516. 
The null hypothesis is not rejected since Z < z.05, and the conclusion drawn is that 
the normally distributed production function does not produce higher TTC amounts over 
the beta distributed production function. It appears that the recruiter's production matters 
only at the individual level. Once the production is aggregated, the differences between 
the two production functions is insignificant. 
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7_(TTCN-TTCB)-D0 
~       fe ^ (   j / °TTCN     ,   °TTCB 
V    16 16 
2. Cost 
Differences for the cost data was tested. Our hypothesis was: 
•"0-    t*CostN  ~   McostB n?\ 
rj   . \^^J 
■"1 •    McostN  >   McostB 
Equation (11) with the cost data was substituted in, and Z = .56216 was 
obtained. Again, the null hypothesis is not rejected since Z < z.05 , and the conclusion is 
that the production function does not significantly affect the cost. 
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VH. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) must increase their 
efficiency as they go into the 21st century. The current quota-based incentive system may 
not be the most efficient way to motivate recruiters to produce at their highest levels. 
The BIRM is an incentive structure that allows the recruiters to provide input on how 
much their local area can produce. The recruiters provide this information to USAREC by 
forecasting how many they can produce for each month. The recruiters are paid a bonus 
for every recruit that they produce over one. 
The bonus table is a critical element of the BIRM. If the bonus payments are too low, 
then the recruiters will not be motivated to overproduce, and if the bonus payments are 
too high, then USAREC will have more recruits than it needs and would have paid more 
than was necessary. 
Background information for developing the bonus table was discussed. It showed 
how the recruiter's forecast and production is tied into the bonus payment, so that 
production that is either greater or smaller than the forecast is penalized an appropriate 
amount. Additionally, several factors are discussed that should be considered when 
setting the bonus levels. 
The key to the BIRM is to understand how and what influences a recruiter's decision 
to forecast a certain production level. Two different methods were used to model the 
recruiter's decision problem and each provided unique insights. The first method used 
decision theory constructs. This process revealed that if a recruiter used expected values 
to make his decision, then he would forecast the level his market would produce. 
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The utility based model dealt with the utility the recruiters derived from the bonus 
payment. USAREC controls the levels of the bonus payments, and the bonus payment 
should control the levels that the recruiter produces. A well-known utility function was 
used to model the recruiter's utility function for money. With this utility function, a cost 
function that described the cost to the recruiter for recruiting p recruits was generated. 
This cost was not an external cost, but a perceived cost to the recruiter. 
When the costs of the quota based system were compared with the simulation 
generated BIRM costs, the costs under the BIRM were found to be significantly lower 
than the costs under the quota system. Even the worst case cost of the BIRM was better 
than the expected cost under the quota system. 
Finally, the production distribution of the individual recruiter does not significantly 
affect the time to completion and costs of the BIRM. For the utility and cost functions, 
the parameters a, ß, and B were significant to the TTC variable and cost variable, along 
with some of their interactions. Future empirical work should attempt to determine the 
exact nature of these distributions, especially the recruiter's cost function. 
Overall, the BIRM should outperform the quota-based system, with a minimum of 
extra work. Under the quota-based system, each recruiter would have to produce 1.5 
recruits per month, or six recruits in a four month period. Under the BIRM, the recruiters 
would have to produce 1.75 recruits per month, or seven recruits in a four month period. 
The recruiters would have to produce only one more recruit over the four months, and 
would receive a bonus for the production of three of the seven recruits. The simulation 
estimated the cost of paying this recruiter the bonus would be less than hiring more 
recruiters. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
USAREC should initiate a pilot plan to test the BIRM with recruiters at a battalion. 
A battalion is recommended for the smallest test group because a battalion can encompass 
46 
different recruiting environments, so that data on the diverse situations in which recruiters 
work could be collected. The recruiting command should also focus their attention on 
determining the exact nature of the recruiter's utility and cost functions. 
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APPENDIX A TURBO PASCAL® RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR 
In order for the simulation to be credible, the random number generator used in the 
simulation must appear "random". The Chi Square test was used to check the random 
number generator.   The Turbo Pascal® built-in generator was checked since it was the 
programming language used in the simulation.    The Turbo Pascal® random number 
generator consistently passed the Chi-square test. 
32,768 (n=2 ) integer random variates wre generated between the values of 0 and 
4096. Each integer between these two values was made a "bin." Each random number 
that was generated was placed into its corresponding bin. The Chi Square test was used 
to check for uniformity. Of 100 runs using this test, 89% of the time the null hypothesis 
would not have been rejected, so the conclusion drawn is that the variates were distributed 
uniformly over the interval. The results of this test are included at the end of this 
appendix. 
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RANDOM NUMBER TEST RESULTS 
Chi Chi 
Test Stat TestStat Difference Test 
1 17.14 27.18 10.04 
2 11.24 27.18 15.94 
3 25.23 27.18 1.96 
4 19.37 27.18 7.82 
5 13.06 27.18 14.12 
6 25.10 27.18 2.09 
7 17.71 27.18 9.47 
8 18.75 27.18 8.43 
9 13.48 27.18 13.70 
10 20.70 27.18 6.48 
11 19.29 27.18 7.89 
12 14.51 27.18 12.67 
13 25.12 27.18 2.06 
14 16.25 27.18 10.94 
15 26.78 27.18 0.40 
16 13.97 27.18 13.22 
17 21.33 27.18 5.85 
IS 21.55 27.18 5.63 
19 19.29 27.18 7.89 
20 30.24 27.18 -3.06 
21 26.03 27.18 1.15 
22 22.01 27.18 5.17 
23 13.91 27.18 13.28 
24 33.48 27.18 -6.30 
25 27.42 27.18 -0.23 
26 20.04 27.18 7.15 
27 29.04 27.18 -1.86 
28 19.08 27.18 8.11 
29 19.56 27.18 7.62 
30 16.02 27.18 11.17 
31 22.17 27.18 5.02 
32 10.04 27.18 17.14 
33 20.73 27.18 6.46 
34 19.01 27.18 8.17 
35 15.16 27.18 12.03 
36 19.86 27.18 7.32 
37 24.00 27.18 3.18 
38 18.42 27.18 8.76 
39 23.20 27.18 3.98 
40 20.47 27.18 6.71 
41 16.84 27.18 10.34 
42 14.19 27.18 13.00 
43 19.36 27.18 7.82 
44 22.04 27.18 5.14 
45 16.66 27.18 10.52 
46 15.22 27.18 11.96 
47 7.61 27.18 19.57 
48 17.51 27.18 9.68 
49 25.39 27.18 1.79 




51 23.34 27.18 
52 16.14 27.18 
53 45.04 27.18 
54 30.11 27.18 
55 15.40 27.18 
56 11.04 27.18 
57 23.91 27.18 
58 22.00 27.18 
59 19.94 27.18 
60 11.16 27.18 
61 27.87 27.18 
62 8.42 27.18 
63 18.24 27.18 
64 15.70 27.18 
65 12.59 27.18 
66 20.35 27.18 
67 21.10 27.18 
68 17.18 27.18 
69 14.94 27.18 
70 30.16 27.18 
71 34.16 27.18 
72 11.50 27.18 
73 17.09 27.18 
74 16.82 27.18 
75 18.68 27.18 
76 25.52 27.18 
77 7.00 27.18 
78 24.68 27.18 
79 21.53 27.18 
80 9.34 27.18 
81 9.63 27.18 
82 18.62 27.18 
83 34.94 27.18 
84 20.08 27.18 
85 17.80 27.18 
86 20.51 27.18 
87 18.99 27.18 
88 15.17 27.18 
89 13.73 27.18 
90 16.99 27.18 
91 15.13 27.18 
92 17.98 27.18 
93 26.03 27.18 
94 20.25 27.18 
95 10.93 27.18 
96 18.04 27.18 
97 25.31 27.18 
98 13.34 27.18 
99 12.17 27.18 



















































Number of Gos= 89 
Number of No Gos = 11 
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APPENDIX B PASCAL SIMULATION SOURCE CODE 
Program Engine; 
uses CRT,Randl,Stats,DOS,Graph; 
const   Recruitforcesize         =         300; 
maxtablesize              =         6; 
Million                       =         1000000; 
gd       :Integer          =        VGA; 







: Array [1. maxtablesize] Of Real; 
Array [1.. maxtablesize] Of Real; 
Array [1..12] Of Integer; 
Array [1.. 12] Of Integer; 
Array [1.. 12] Of Real; 
StationType = array[L.RecruitForcesize] of RecruiterType; 
type ForceType = record 
TotMonthPred            : Array [ 1.. 12] of Longint; 
TotMonthProd           : Array [1.12] of Longint; 
TotMonthBonus         : Array [1.. 12] of Double; 
end; 
type AggregateType =record 
DataPred           : Array [ 1.. 12] of Longint; 
DataProd           : Array [ 1.. 12] of Longint; 







array [1..14] of ForceType; 
AggregateType; 
: Longint; 
YTDProd                          : Longint; 
YTDBonus                         : real; 
BonusTotal                        : real; 
YTDBonusAvg                   : real; 
cutoff                                 ; Longint; 
Cutoffpoint                         : Integer; 
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Cutoffpoint Avgl : Real; 
CutoffpointAvg2 : Real; 
CutOffPtTotal : Integer; 
Cycle : Integer; 
SampVar : Real; 
StopTest : Real; 
BonusTable : array [1.. 6, 1..6] of real; 
Flag : Boolean; 
outfile : text; 
outfile2 : text; 
hl, mini, secl, hundl : word; 
h2, min2, sec2, hund2 : word; 
h3, min3, sec3, hund3 : word; 
RunTime, TotTime : real; 
Alphamean : real; 
Betamean : real; 
Bmean : real; 
Thetamean : real; 
Alphastdev : real; 
Betastdev : real; 
Bstdev : real; 
Thetastdev : real; 
TPM : integer; 










then begin Alphamean:= 0.10; end 
else begin Alphamean:= 0.20; 
end; 
If TPM=(1 or 2 or 5 or 6 or 9 or 10 or 13 or 14) 
then begin Betamean:= 1.1; end 
else begin Betamean:= 2.0; 
end; 
If (TPM <= 4) or ((TPM >=9) and (TPM <= 12 )) 
then begin Bmean :=    3; end 
else begin Bmean :=   8; 
end; 
If(TPM<9) 
then begin Thetamean:=    3; end 
else begin Thetamean:=    8; 
end; 
Alphastdev := 0.05; 
Betastdev :=0.25; 
Bstdev     := 1.0; 
Thetastdev := 1.0; 
if(TPM=l) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Caselc.pas'); 
if(TPM = 2) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Case2c.pas'); 
if(TPM = 3) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Case3c.pas'); 
if(TPM = 4) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Case4c.pas'); 
If(TPM = 5) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Case5c.pas'); 
if(TPM = 6) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Case6c.pas'); 
if(TPM = 7) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Case7c.pas'); 
if(TPM = 8) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Case8c.pas'); 
If(TPM = 9) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Case9c.pas'); 
if (TPM =10) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\CaselOc.pas') 
if (TPM =11) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Casellc.pas') 
if (TPM =12) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Casel2c.pas'): 
If (TPM =13) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Casel3c.pas') 
if (TPM =14) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Casel4c.pas') 
if(TPM=15) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Casel5c.pas') 
if(TPM=16) then Assign(outfile,'C:\nps\thesis\Casel6c.pas') 
rewrite(outfile); 
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writeln(outfile,'Alpha := Normal(',Alphamean:3:2, ',',alphastdev:3:2,')'); 
writeln(outfile,'Beta := Normal(',Betamean:3:2,V,Betastdev:3:2,')'); 
writeln(outfile,'B     := Normal(',Bmean:3:2,V,Bstdev:3:2,')'); 




var    k,p,t:integer; 
BaseTable : array[1..10, 1.10] of real; 
Amount 1: real; 
response : char; 
Begin 
Randomize; 
{Calculate the Base Table } 
For k := 1 to maxtablesize do begin 
For p := 1 to maxtablesize do begin 









j*******************j}EY£LQp THE BONUS TABLE***********************) 
for P:=l to maxtablesize do begin 
BonusTable[p,p]:=50 +(p-l)*25; 
end; 







{Calculate the rest of the table} 
for p:=l to maxtablesize do begin 
for k:=l to maxtablesize do begin 






until t =p; 
BonusTable[k,p]:=BonusTable[k-l,p]+( Amount 1 )*(BonusTable[k,k]- 
BonusTable[k-l,k-l]); 
end; 






until t =k; 
BonusTable[k,p] :=BonusTable[k,p-1 ]-(1 -Amount 1 )* 
(BonusTable[p,p]-BonusTable[p-1 ,p-1 ]); 










For i:=l to RecruitForcesize do begin 
For j:=l to 12 do begin 
Recruiter[i] .Prediction!]] :=0; 
Recruiter[i] .Production!]] :=0; 
Recruiter[i] .BonusPayment[j] :=0; 
end; 
end; 













until Alpha > 0; 
repeat 
Beta:=Normal(Betamean,2); 
until Beta > 0; 
repeat 
B:=Normal(Bmean,2); 
until (B > 1); 
repeat 
Theta:=Normal(Thetamean,0.5); 
until Theta > 0; 
For i:=l to RecruitForcesize do begin 
For x:=l to maxtablesize do begin 
Recruiter[i] RecruitersUtilityfx] := 







Function GetPrediction(RecruiterID: Integer):Integer; 
var UtilDiff,UtilTest: real; 
















until (i=6) ; 
If Prediction <= 0 then begin GetPrediction:= l;end 
else if Prediction > 5 then begin GetPrediction:=5;end 
else begin   GetPrediction := Prediction;end; 
end; {GetPrediction} 
Function GetProduction(RecruiterID,mth:Integer):Integer; 







if Production > 5 then begin GetProduction:=5;end 
else if Production <= 0 then begin GetProduction:=l;end 






if (Recruiter[RecruiterID].Production[Mth] or 
Recruiter[RecruiterID] Prediction[Mth])= 0 
then begin Payment := 0;end 
else if (Recmiter[RecruiterID].Production[Mth] or 
Recruiter[RecruiterID] .Prediction[Mth])> 5 
then begin Payment := 
BonusTable[Recruiter[RecruiterID].Production[5], 





if (Payment < 0) then begin 
















for t:=l to RecruitForcesize do begin 
TotPrediction:= TotPrediction + 
(Recruiter[t] .Prediction[m]); 
TotProduction:= TotProduction + 
(Recruiter[t] .Production[m]); 
TotBonus:= TotBonus + 
(Recruiter[t] .BonusPayment[m]); 
end; 
{Keep a running count for each batch of 300 recruiters} 
RecruiterForce[que].TotMonthPred[m]:=TotPrediction; 








forf := 1 to 12 do begin 
















for d:=l to 12 do begin 
















For q:=l to 14 do begin {We are simulating 300 recruiters x 14 =4200} 
Initialize; 
Utility; 
For Month:=l to 12 do begin 
RecruiterForcefq] .TotMonthPred[month] :=0; 
RecruiterForcefq] .TotMonthProd[month] :=0; 
RecruiterForcefq] .TotMonthBonus[month] :=0; 
For j:=l to Recruitforcesize do begin 
Recruiterfj] .Prediction[Month] :=GetPrediction(j); 
Recruiter!]] .Production[Month] :=GetProduction(j,month); 













writeln(outfile,'CutOff Month:     ', CutOfrPoint:2, 
'   Average   = ',CutOffPointAvgl:4:2); 
if Cycle > 1 then begin 
SampVar:=((Cycle-l)*SampVar/Cycle)+Sqr(CutOffPointAvg2)- 
((Cycle)* Sqr(CutOffPointAvg 1 )/(Cycle-1))+ 
(Sqr(CutOfiPoint))/(Cycle-l); 
write(outfile,'Samp Variance: ',SampVar:4:2); 
end; 
CutOffPoint Avg2:=CutoffPoint Avg 1; 
if SampVar > 0 then begin 
Stoptest:=(1.96*sqrt(SampVar/Cycle))/CutoffPointAvg2; 
writeln(outfile,'   Stop Test = ',StopTest:4:2); 
end; 
{GetTime(h3, min3, sec3, hund3); 
writeln(outfile, 'Current Time   ',h3,':', min3,':', sec3,':', hund3);} 
writeln(outfile, 'Bonus payment: ' ,YTDBonus:4:2, 






GetTime(h2, min2, sec2, hund2); 
writeln(outfile); 
writelnfoutfile l******',:***************iic***************************!i!**'y 
writeln(outfile, 'Start Time   ',hl,*:', mini,':', seel,1:', hundl); 
writeln(outfile, 'Finish Time   ',h2,':', min2,':', sec2,':', hund2); 
ifhl>12thenhl:=hl-12; 
ifh2>12thenh2:=h2-12; 
RunTime:=    ((h2*3600)+(min2*60)+(sec2+(hund2/100)) )- 
((hl*3600)+(minl*60)+(secl+(hundl/100))); 
writeln(outfile,'Running Time is ', Runtime:8:2,' seconds'); 



































APPENDIX C SIMULATION RAW DATA 
Table 15 summarizes the raw data from the simulation. TTCN is the time to 
completion of the recruiting mission when the recruiter's production is modeled as 
normally distributed. CostN is the estimated cost of the BIRM to recruit 39,600 civilians. 
TTCB and CostB are the same as TTCN and CostN, but with the recruiter's production 
distribution modeled as beta distributed. 
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Run TTCN CostN TTCB CostB 
1 3.00 1.28 3.00 .96 
2 3.49 1.09 3.89 1.13 
2 4.34 1.06 4.00 1.05 
4 5.37 1.27 4.94 1.33 
5 3.43 1.08 3.89 1.23 
6 4.80 1.21 4.36 1.19 
7 5.13 1.22"" 4.79 1.27 
8 6.00 1.45 5.00 1.31 
9 3.00 1.26 3.00 .98 
10 3.54 1.09 3.93 1.23 
11 4.33 1.00 4.04 1.08 
12 5.36 1.26 4.95 1.30 
13 3.49 1.10 3.95 1.14 
14 4.84 1.23 4.29 1.16 
15 5.06 1.20 4.80 1.28 
16 6.00 1.45 5.00 1.31 
AVG 4.45 1.20 4.24 1.18 
Table 15 Simulation Results 
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APPENDIX D EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN RESULTS 
A. ESTIMATED EFFECTS AND COEFFICIENTS FOR TTCN 
1 • Estimated Effects and Coefficients for TTCN-Full Model. 












4.44875       0.05445        81.70 
0.95250       0.47625       0.05445         8.75 
1.50000       0.75000       0.05445        13.77 
0.79000       0.39500       0.05445         7.25 
0.00750       0.00375       0.05445         0 07 
0.01500       0.00750       0.05445         0 14 
0.18000       0.09000       0.05445         1 65 
0.01250       0.00625       0.05445         0.11 
-0.09250      -0.04625      0.05445        -0.85 
-0.03000      -0.01500      0.05445        -0.28 













Table 16 Estimated Effects of TTCN 
Estimated Effects and Coefficients for TTCN- Reduced Model- 






4.44875       0.03965      112.19 
0.95250       0.47625       0.03965       12 01 
1.50000       0.75000      0.03965       18 91 
0.79000       0.39500      0.03965        9.96 






Table 17 Estimated Effects of TTCN (Reduced Model) 
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B. ESTIMATED EFFECTS AND COEFFICIENTS FOR TTCB 
1. Estimated Effects and Coefficients for TTCB - Full Model 
Term Effort Cnef StHCnef t-valne P 
Constant 4.2394 0.01387 305.74 0.000 
Alpha 0.6112 0.3056 0.01387 22.04 0.000 
Beta 0.9012 0.4506 0.01387 32.50 0.000 
B 0.5413 0.2706 0.01387 19.52 0.000 
Theta 0.0112 0.0056 0.01387 0.41 0.702 
Alpha Äßeta -0.0463 -0.0231 0.01387 -1.67 0.156 
Alpha*B -0.3063 -0.1531 0.01387 -11.04 0.000 
Alpha*Theta -0.0163 -0.0081 0.01387 -0.59 0.583 
Beta*B -0.1262 -0.0631 0.01387 -4.55 0.006 
Beta*Theta 0.0038 0.0019 0.01387 0.14 0.898 
B*Theta -0.0112 -0.0056 0.01387 -0.41 0.702 
Table 18 Estimated Effects of TTCB 
2. Estimated Effects and Coefficients for TTCB - Reduced Model 
Term Effort Cnfif StriCnef t-valnp P 
Constant 4.2394 0.01276 332.16 0.000 
Alpha 0.6112 0.3056 0.01276 23.95 0.000 
Beta 0.9012 0.4506 0.01276 35.31 0.000 
B 0.5413 0.2706 0.01276 21.20 0.000 
AIpha*B -0.3063 -0.1531 0.01276 -12.00 0.000 
Beta*B -0.1262 -0.0631 0.01276 -4.95 0.000 
Table 19 Estimated Effects of TTCB (Reduced Model) 
3. Unusual Observations for TTCB 
Obs. TTCB Fit Stdev.Fit Residual StResid 
6 4.36000 4.27500 0.03126 0.08500 2.11R 
Table 20 Unusual Observations of TTCB 
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C. ESTIMATED EFFECTS AND COEFFICIENTS FOR COSTN 
1. Estimated Effects and Coefficients for CostN - Full Model 
Term FfTert Caef Std Cnef t-vahif! P 
Constant 1.20313 0.01717 70.08 0.000 
Alpha 0.10625 0.05313 0.01717 3.09 0.027 
Beta 0.07125 0.03562 0.01717 2.07 0.093 
B 0.07875 0.03938 0.01717 2.29 0.070 
Theta -0.00875 -0.00437 0.01717 -0.25 0.809 
Alp*Beta 0.13125 0.06562 0.01717 3.82 0.012 
Alpha*B 0.07875 0.03937 0.01717 2.29 0.070 
Alpha*Theta 0.01125 0.00562 0.01717 0.33 0.756 
Beta*B 0.10375 0.05188 0.01717 3.02 0.029 
Beta*Theta -0.01375 -0.00687 0.01717 -0.40 0.705 
B*Theta 0.01375 0.00687 0.01717 0.40 0.705 
Table 21 Estimated Effects of CostN 
2. Estimated Effects and Coefficients for CostN- Reduced Model 
Term FfTert Cnef Std Cnef t-VfllllP P 
Constant 1.20313 0.01341 89.70 0.000 
Alpha 0.10625 0.05313 0.01341 3.96 0.003 
Beta 0.07125 0.03562 0.01341 2.66 0.026 
B 0.07875 0.03938 0.01341 2.94 0.017 
Alpha*Beta 0.13125 0.06562 0.01341 4.89 0.000 
AIpha*B 0.07875 0.03937 0.01341 2.94 0.017 
Beta*B 0.10375 0.05188 0.01341 3.87 0.004 
Table 22 Estimated Effects of CostN (Reduced Model) 
67 
D. ESTIMATED EFFECTS AND COEFFICIENTS FOR COSTB 
1. Estimated Effects and Coefficients for CostB - Full Model 
Term Effect Coef StdCoef t-value P 
Constant 1.18438 0.009375 126.33 0.000 
Alpha 0.12125 0.06062 0.009375 6.47 0.001 
Beta 0.11375 0.05687 0.009375 6.07 0.002 
B 0.10375 0.05187 0.009375 5.53 0.003 
Theta 0.00125 0.00062 0.009375 0.07 0.949 
Alp*Beta 0.02125 0.01062 0.009375 1.13 0.308 
Alpha*B -0.10875 -0.05438 0.009375 -5.80 0.002 
Alpha*Theta 0.00875 0.00437 0.009375 0.47 0.660 
Beta*B -0.00125 -0.00063 0.009375 -0.07 0.949 
Beta*Theta 0.00125 0.00063 0.009375 0.07 0.949 
B*Theta -0.02875 -0.01438 0.009375 -1.53 0.186 
Table 23 Estimated Effects of CostB 
2. Estimated Effects and Coefficients for CostB - Reduced Model 
Term Effect Cnef Std Coef t-value P 
Constant 1.18438 0.008417 140.71 0.000 
Alpha 0.12125 0.06062 0.008417 7.20 0.000 
Beta 0.11375 0.05687 0.008417 6.76 0.000 
B 0.10375 0.05187 0.008417 6.16 0.000 
Alpha*B -0.10875 -0.05438 0.008417 -6.46 0.000 
Table 24 Estimated Effects of CostN (Reduced Model) 
3. Unusual Observations for CostB 
Ohs.        CaKtK 













Table 25 Unusual Observations of TTCB 
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APPENDIX E RECRUITERS HISTORICAL PRODUCTION 
Table 25 summarizes the data received from USAREC. Some of the original raw 
data had to be discarded because some production amounts were less than zero and some 
recruiter counts were also less than zero. This data was assumed to be either incorrectly 
coded or that this data came from new recruiting stations. Still, the data from at least 
1,250 recruiting stations was used for each month, which should still give a good 
approximation of the average number of recruiters and accessions achieved. 
The overall average of recruits achieved per recruiter was 6.85/4.95 = 1.38. The 
previous year's NHPL was about 1.29 recruits per month. 




of Recruits Accessed 
per Recruiting Station 
Oct94 4.81 7.18 
Nov94 4.78 5.98 
Dec 94 4.78 7.02 
Jan 95 5.08 7.51 
Feb95 5.08 6.81 
Mar 95 5.06 6.88 
Apr 95 4.96 6.75 
May 95 4.97 6.86 
Jun95 4.96 6.26 
Jul95 5.03 7.27 
Average 4.95 6.85 
Table 26 Historical Production Level (Oct 94- Jul 95) 
69 
70 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Asch, B.J., Navy Recruiter Productivity and the Freeman Plan, RAND, 1990. 
Henderson, R.I., Compensation Management, Rewarding Performance, 3rd Edition, 
Reston Publishing Company, Inc., 1982. 
Law, A.M. and Kelton, W.D., Simulating Modeling and Analysis, 2nd Edition, McGraw- 
Hill, Inc., 1991. 
Lewis, J.M., An Examination of the Influence of Environmental Factors on Recruiting 
Category I - III A Males, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1987. 
Lyons, S. and Riester, B., U.S. Army Recruiting: A Critical Analysis of Unit Costing and 
the Introduction of Recruiting Bonus Incentive Model, Master's Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1993. 
Marshall, K.T. and Oliver, R.M., Decision Making and Forecasting with Emphasis on 
Model Building, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995. 
Pious, S., The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993. 
71 
72 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center      2 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6245 
2. Library, Code 52     2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
3. Professor A.H. Buss, Code OR/Bu     1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
4. Professor K. Kang, Code SM/Kk     5 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
5. Professor K. T. Terasawa, Code SM/Tk     1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
6. CPT S.Piper  
314 Arloncourt Road 
Seaside, California 93955 
73 
